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To theatricalize law is to ask lawyers to be aware and responsive to the world that creates them and to be
conscious of worlds beyond words. For the theatrical reminds us that law has to see as well as to interpret, and
that seeing occurs through the body, even more so than the intellect. Reviewing the work of some of the key
scholars whose work engages with the concept of theatricalizing law, this article challenges the presumption of
dramatic verities and certainties as the mark of an effective critical form in law. Instead, to think law
theatrically challenges knowledge, expectations, beliefs, certainties, assumptions, and prejudices, and this
article concludes with an example of the challenge wrought by a simple theatricalization in which a set of
images that could and did mean anything were played, allowing the audience to make their choices because
they were unguided. And then the most exceptional and meaningless of the images were explained, and the
horror imbricated in them revealed. This theatricalization did its job, and the text revealed in ways that law as
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To theatricalize law is to ask lawyers to be aware and responsive to the world that creates them and 
to be conscious of worlds beyond words. For the theatrical reminds us that law has to see as well as 
to interpret, and that seeing occurs through the body, even more so than the intellect. Reviewing 
the work of some of the key scholars whose work engages with the concept of theatricalD2izing law, 
this article challenges the presumption of dramatic verities and certainties as the mark of an 
effective critical form in law. Instead, to think law theatrically challenges knowledge, expectations, 
beliefs, certainties, assumptions, and prejudices, and this article concludes with an example of the 
challenge wrought by a simple theatricalization in which a set of images that could and did mean 
anything were played, allowing the audience to make their choices because they were unguided. 
And then the most exceptional and meaningless of the images were explained, and the horror 
imbricated in them revealed. This theatricalization did its job, and the text revealed in ways that law 
as drama could not, as this article reveals, as a theatricalization of its own. 
To be enraged 
 
“theasthai … is to look with one’s mouth wide open, i.e. ‘to gape’ or ‘stare’”. One becomes nothing 
but an eye, raptly gazing more than distinguishing matters clearly … the mode of seeing that underlies 
both theoria  and the word “theater” amounts, on a certain level, to marveling from a standpoint far 
from meaning – ecstatic vision, or gawking without understanding. Olga Taxidou has put it well: “the 
difference between philosophy and theoria is the body with all its senses. Possibly the difference 
between philosophy and theoria is that theoria needs to be experienced through the body – the 
senses, that is, the aesthetic”.
1
  
Hans-Thies Lehmann Tragedy and Dramatic Theater 2016 
There could be nothing more damning for law than the mark of the theatrical,2 as shaped through its 
classical Platonic, Christian and Enlightenment inheritance which abnegates theater and the 
theatrical,3 as a danger to reason and intellect, and thus a failure of the ideal of law.4 Plato, Hans-
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Thies Lehmann suggests, is enraged by theater in the form of tragedy,5 but regardless, the ideal that 
Plato expresses results in legal assumptions that treats the theatrical with contempt, as code for 
speciousness,6 or as the mark of the histrionic,7 as we see in the two instances, the first from 
argument by counsel in a 2015 Australian superior court case, and the second contained in a brief 
judgment, again from an Australian superior court, 15 years earlier: 
That means that without having to go through the utterly artificial, and we would 
submit unconvincing, notion of staging  theatricals about who would have done what 
with increasing difficulties of assessing the probabilities of who would have done what, 
the matter raised by the non-disclosure is at the level of underwriting decision-making, 
raised in the forensic contest and it is the insurance decision-making, the underwriting 
decision which is at the heart of 28(3), and the disappointed insured puts forward their 
best case.  
HIS HONOUR: I have listened to lengthy submissions, some of which have a degree of 
the theatrical, some at times hysterical, and nearly always irrelevant. The position has 
been reached where I must say that Mrs Von Risefer has not listened to what the 
Courts have told her on previous occasions and she is plainly abusing the process of 
the Courts. This application is an abuse of that process. It is only compassion for 
litigants who face eviction from their home that induces me to refuse the respondent's 
application for indemnity costs. 
In each, submission and judgment, we are left in little doubt - we see the sneer, the smirk, the sigh of 
exasperation at play. Barrister and judge speak to the antitheatrical prejudice, the dismissal of 
theater as subaltern and dangerous but through the adoption of the language of theater, debased as 
it is, engages in the most theatrical gesture, as it were, in order to negative a witness, a submission or 
a proposed course of action. That the Platonic ideal of justice through word and reason, through law 
contra the theatrical is found in this kind of everyday law, the law of insurance, the allocation of 
property rights, might seem surprising, for the image of the theatrical is rarely applied to law of this 
kind. The theatrical is seen to play out in the most visible forms of law, the criminal trial, the trial of 
high stakes that occurs in so-called ‘theaters of justice’.8  For Hannah Arendt the ‘staging’ of the trial 
of Adolf Eichmann in Israel in 1961 militated against law and justice,9 made worse by the bodily 
reaction of witnesses as ‘show’. The trial as show appalled her, ‘not just the figure of Eichmann but 
also his Israeli prosecutors and even the dramatic gestures of some of the holocaust survivors who 
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took the witness stand during the trial’.10  But in spite of herself, Arendt was overcome by her own 
bodily responses - Plato might have been enraged, but Arendt laughed, which ‘caught her by surprise 
and overcame her’, and permeated her writing about the 1961 trial.11   
Arend’ts Eichmann in Jerusalem (1963) might bear the mark of this laughter, but it is not a laughter 
of joy. Instead, this is a sneering laughter that points to the criticism of the modes of legality that 
occurred in the trial, and by extension, to the Israeli government. Despite her own treatment in Nazi 
Germany because of her Jewishness, Arendt adhered to forms of justice that accorded with 
Weberian perfection, and she could not abide the theatrical disruption that she witnessed, and led 
to her sneering account of the trial. She despised what she saw as theater, and so too the Australian 
barrister and Australian judge within the forms that law takes – submissions on the law and a 
decision on the law. 
It is in this register that I will be taking this essay. The theatrical, as it were, has been crowded out by 
the prominence of the meta-trial, of the Eichmann-type, which can be all consuming of the field, that 
is, that they seem and are seen to represent law, and function as all law insofar as law might in some 
way speak to theater and vice versa. Instead, my purpose here is to take us back to the less visible 
and more prosaic law that embeds the antitheatrical along with the physicality that resides in its 
alterity – the smirk, the laugh, the sigh of exasperation. For when I talk of law, I need to emphasise 
that it is not the popularly imagined trial, criminal or otherwise,12 or the execution of judgment to 
which I refer, nor plays about law. Or, indeed, spectacle or performance or image, in Peter 
Goodrich’s terms: 
The trial has been a focus of studies of the theatricality of law, usually framed 
within a literary argot and method … law in film has become a significant focus of 
interdisciplinary legal study, but again the subject is usually law as acted out in 
entertainment dramas … the spectacle of law as relayed through the monumental, 
written, embodied, and enacted performances of lawyers themselves, gains little 
express recognition or examination. Modern historians and humanists address 
certain features and moments of the legal spectacle with a wealth of erudition, 
specialism, and insight, but their focus is generally the spectacle and not the law … 
the show trial, as historical act and filmic genre, rather than the legal mise en scène, 
the juristic import and expression ...13 (references omitted, my emphasis) 
This latter sentiment, which I will inevitably make less lyrical and more prosaic, touches on my 
concern here, that it is through the work of law in its texts and their reading by lawyers - judgments 
that hold the law as case law – and the awareness of the stories of lives contained within and that 
are plugged into them. It is these and the need for their reading to achieve justice,14 what Goodrich 
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calls the ‘theatrical arrangements that precede appearance and audition’,15 that needs attention, in 
a world that seems to be ready-made, a law of Google, and a law of the self.16 For justice requires 
lawyers to do more than read and apply law – it requires that they have an awareness that will 
enable them to seek justice, to counteract that image of law embedded through the logics that 
derive from Plato and Arendt and beyond, that enters the body, through the theatrical. 
 
 Theater 
 I can take any empty space and call it a bare stage. A man walks across this empty space whilst 




Peter Brook The Empty Space 1968 
[tragedy and theater is] base poiesis, merely the result of artisanal “doing” and not real activity in the higher, 
intellectual sense … If artistic mimesis in general already proves deficient and involves only what is sensory, 
then matters stand even worse when it is concretely embodied in acting; inasmuch as it occurs through 




Hans-Thies Lehmann 2016  
It is not hard to see why the term “theater” and “the theatrical” as a concept can be conflated with 
related terms that are familiar to anyone who has experienced literary drama and plays at school or 
elsewhere. What we learn quickly enough is that the literary quality and characteristic of these 
forms becomes the prime site of attention, as literature. The idea of spectacle and staging and play 
and performance, a word and concept I have been avoiding, not least the sense in which 
performance has become overborne by performatives of all varieties (as Alan Read remarks ‘We are 
all performers now’),19  and the means through which being is created or resisted.20 The demand of 
expectation inbuilt in common parlance relating to accomplishment in a range of instances (‘he 
performed well’, ‘she needs to improve her performance’), are all bound up in the notion that there 
is a representable text that demands conformity. We find this meaning imbricated in the Oxford 
English Dictionary definition: where reference to ‘theater, that can be ‘staged’, ‘performed’, and/or 
‘acted’, in which drama became play, and play drama. Owing to its etymology from the Latin for 
‘play’ and the Greek for ‘deed, action, play, especially tragedy, and to do, act, perform’,21 the 
contemporary definitions of drama are fundamentally antitheatrical, or at best, untheatrical:  ‘A 
composition in prose or verse, adapted to be acted upon a stage, in which a story is related by 
means of dialogue and action, and is represented with accompanying gesture, costume, and 
scenery, as in real life; a play, melodrama, the dramatic branch of literature; the dramatic art, and a 
series of actions or course of events having a unity like that of a drama’.22 Drama, then, is 
storytelling, etymologically now far removed from its origins as doing and playing.23 Drama, thus 
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defined, is conceived as a work of the mind, rather than the work of the body, the ‘artisanal’ as mere 
cipher, who will stage, perform or accomplish, that is, that which is theater and theatrical, as a 
central conceit of antitheatricality.  
To negate the body is precisely Arendt’s complaint of theatricality - as a debasement that occurs 
through unreasoning bodies that might be enraged or laugh. But as Hans-Thies Lehmann makes 
clear,  the theatrical body is something far more than mere cipher, or unreasoning: ‘Body, rhythm, 
breathing, the here and now of the unthinkable presence of the body, its eroticism, these 
undermind the Logos. This body is at the same time the place of suffering and pain, the mute body 
…’.24 This mute body that thinks before the reasoning mind comes into play, operates at a higher 
level of function that operates beyond the limitations of text-based drama,25  but rather functions in 
a space ‘on the borderline of logic and reason, on the threshold between what is thinkable and 
beyond reasoning’.26  For reasons that are historically misplaced, Lehmann argues, European theater 
tradition has been dominated by text and word,27 and ‘assigned the highest place in theater’.28 The 
caesura marking a return to a theater beyond the text is traced at least to Artaud in the 1930s,29 or 
indeed to earlier experiments at the end of the 19th century and into the early 20th century, through 
the work of Meyerhold and others.30 To be brief, as Peter Brook’s famous epithet reminds us, all you 
need for theater is an empty space with two people, one to do and the other to watch or participate. 
To do this requires presence, attention and awareness, not only in that place, but in the preparation 
of the self so that the theasthai is rendered beyond a meaningless gawp. 
Plays, drama, spectacle – none of these things are needed for theater. Thea, in all its manifestations, 
is the etymological starting point for theory, a way to see, and theater and all its derivations.31 But so 
too is theasthai . For as Lehmann reminds us in the opening epigraph with which I started this essay, 
and as we’ve seen with Arendt’s accidental laughter, seeing occurs through the body as much as it 
does through the intellect, and each shapes the other. This is not spectacle or bare show, or mere 
entertainment. To be caught in the body is to be responsive and responsible. I will return to how this 
might be made manifest at the end of this essay, but I get ahead of myself.  
I have moved into accounting for the difference between the forms of theater and drama, before 
considering the meaning of theater, for a very good reason. Korsten, for instance, has begun to use 
the term ‘theater proper’ when referring to its meaning,32 that is the etymologically perfect form of 
theater used in the OED: the ‘Latin theātrum, the Greek place for viewing, especially a theater, to 
behold or sight, view, a spectator)’.33 This is why I intervened with Lehmann’s more expansive 
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33
 For an instance of the confusion of definitions, see Francis Bacon’s complaint of the Idol of the Theater . The 
direction of his complaint was drama: Klein, Jürgen, "Francis Bacon", The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Winter 2016 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = 
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/francis-bacon/: 3.1.4; Cf. Ragnhild Tronstad, “Could the 
accounting of theasthai, and the difference between the theatrical and dramatic, and for reasons that are 
reiterate Goodrich’s concern that: ‘Law is a theater that denies its theatricality, an order of images that 
claims invisibility, a series of performances that desire to be taken as the dead letter of prose and so 
the dead hand of the law’.34 This is far from surprising, though, for to think in terms of Korsten’ ‘theater 
proper’ is to limit the thing that the theatrical can do for law and for lawyers (and judges).  Without having a 
real sense in theater and theatrical function, it is necessary to move beyond the limits of etymology, 
into theater as I have already sketched – a place of the body, a place of responsibility, and a place in 
which response is shared.  
This means returning the theatrical to its place within theater, with the position of theater scholars 
as a term of art within theater,35 that has sought to re-orient Goffman’s idea of a theater (as drama, 
it must be said),36 and Richard Schechner’s performance theory have opened theater and its 
concepts wide, beyond theater.37 To narrow theater and the shape of theatricality, rather than the 
world at large is to think beyond the idea of ‘showing doing’ that is embedded within Schechner,38 
and asking that we try not to think about our conduct as dramatic scripts in the world (they are 
nothing of the sort). I use theater concepts to reorient in order to think about the productive 
capacity of theater to help us think in law about ways to see, and how we might train our bodies to 
use theater beyond sneering and sighing and laughing, to become more responsive lawyers and legal 
interpreters, to think in terms of a postdramatic law.  
This also means I will be asking that we are sceptical of the OEDs ‘theater’ definitions which are still 
mired in a late 19th century imaginary. We are told of most of the definitions that ‘This entry has not 
yet been fully updated (first published 1912)’. That is not to say that there haven’t been inclusions 
since 1912, so much so that it holds onto meanings that were shaped in the 19th century and haven’t 
moved on. ‘Theatricality’, contrary to its usage noted above, is confined to: ‘A tendency to 
theatricality and effusiveness’ (1880); ‘The absurd theatricalities with which the … campaign is now 
mainly carried on.’ (1889). It is not hard to see where a judge or member of the Bar would get their 
own image of the theatrical, but these definitions also defer to an idea of  theater within a narrow 
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dimension, that is, that it is a place, a building, that constitutes a theater, and so too, the audience 
that watches.  
But the OED also synonyms theater with drama to mean: ‘Dramatic works collectively’, ’theatrical or 
dramatic entertainment … an action or work of art that has the quality of (good, etc.) drama or 
theatrical technique … dramatic effect or sensation, spectacle, outward show without serious inward 
intent.’ And this is telling, because the words theater and drama are constantly misapplied, treated 
as being synonymous, but most importantly, result in misconceptions and errors that seek to turn 
‘drama into theater’. The most extraordinary of these errors is found in the entry for Artaud’s 
theater of cruelty that strips it of theater and reinstantiated as drama: ‘a collective term for plays in 
which the dramatist seeks to communicate a sense of pain, suffering, and evil through the portrayal 
of extreme physical violence’.39 That is a profound misconception and misdescription of the Theater 
of Cruelty – it is theater (not drama) that seeks to penetrate or pierce our complacency, to make us 
respond, into the unconscious, through the body. Artaud warned against such a literal reading: ‘as 
soon as I said “cruelty” everyone took it to mean “blood”. But a “theater of cruelty” means theater 
that is difficult and cruel for myself first of all’.40 Moreover, the theater of cruelty requires no 
‘drama’ at all, as the exemplary mode of theater, it is capable of functioning within Brook’s empty 
space: ‘Theater can reinstruct those who have forgotten the communicative power or magic mimicry 
of gesture, because a gesture contains its own energy, and there are still human beings in theater to 
reveal the power of those gestures’.41 The conflation of terms along with the inaccuracies built into 
the definition, do precisely what Goodrich notes is wrong about legal interpreters – that in law we 
believe words to always  be correct (acknowledging the rule of statutory construction, that 
dictionary definitions are only opinions of words), but these definition of theater of cruelty in the 
OED demands conformity with expectation – drama as literature, and theater as something excess 
and unacceptable, as a body that has gone too far. 
This definition, as in law, is remade to conform to expectations, in which the bodily cannot be 
comprehended. The Theater of Cruelty is the exemplary form through which the theatrical occurs – 
not perhaps the ‘theater proper’ of Korsten, but the theatrical as it was remade, from the late 19th 
century onwards, through Artaud. As Hans-Thies Lehmann points out, it is the theatrical (not drama) 
makes self-awareness manifest through anagnorisis, that is, that moment of awareness or 
realisation. Rather than operating as a dramatic self-awareness, in the postdramatic theater, this 
point of perception is meant to disrupt expectations:  
We stand [now] before a theater that seeks less to “serve up” a work than to provoke 
renewed critical engagement and to elicit judgment and discussion of its relation to 
performance … anagnorisis often does not occur in a dramaturgical capacity in 
contemporary theater; rather, it takes place as a caesura that regularly punctuates our 
understanding of the theatrical process42… Theater is not to be defined as a dramatic 
process, but as one that is corporeal, scenic, musical, auditory and visual – in space and 
time: a material process that implies its own being-- seen or participation, even as it 
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displays a certain opacity that resists full perceptive penetration [wahrnehmende 
Durchdringung] just as much as it refuses complete rationalization.43 
This, of course, is precisely the thing that law is afraid of, what Arendt feared, and that our imagined 
belief in the ability of words to armour and defend against this kind of rupture that this kind of 
anagnorisis requires of us. As Christian Biet remarks, in its intervention in politics and the polis, 
theater: ‘complexifies the data it introduces in an ephemeral presence, or an ephemeral present, 
before and with co-present individuals. In doing that, it brings life to these judgements, gives them a 
body and flesh of a different kind than that of images.’44 The belief in a perceptual possibility is 
bound up within law, but of course it is something that normally is imagined as a form of the 
unconscious or the invisible. Theater, of course, through our bodies, makes this present in ways that 
are both dangerous and misunderstood. It is this kind of theater and its practices that has something 
to tell us in law, but one which has been largely overlooked in favour of the literary as drama, the 
political as theater, the theoretical as drama, though there has been a lively engagement with 
theater through Badiou,45 Artaud, via Derrida,46 or the immensely significant work that has derived 
through Legendre,47 through Peter Goodrich’s work,48and the spectacle, 49  the unconscious,50 and 
the mask.51  Bu there is theater too, theater of the kind that I have been playing out in this essay. 
There are limited instances of the theatrical at play. Peter Rush creates the exemplary theater 
experience in his essay in the first issue of Law and Critique,52 while my theatricalisations are 
sometimes read as stories, as a reframing as drama, in ways that I did not expect.53 That is not to say 
that the dramatic and the play as sites of law and as critical interventions as justice, is 
inconsequential. On the contrary. From the immense literature spawned by Hegel’s reading of 
Antigone and Benjamin’s Trauerspiel,54 from Aristodemou to Extabe, Paul Raffield’s readings of law 
                                                          
43
 Lehmann, Tragedy and Dramatic Theater, 424. 
44
 Christian Biet, “Towards a Dramaturgy of Appearance An aesthetic and political understanding of the 
theatrical event as session,” Performance Research:  A Journal of the Performing Arts 14, no.3 (2009), 102-109, 
109. 
45
Alain Badiou, Rhapsody for the Theater, ed. and trans. Bruno Bosteels (London: Verso, 2013); Alain Badiou 
with Nicolas Truong, In Praise of Theater (London: Polity, 2015); Martin Puchner, “The Theater of Alain 
Badiou,” Theater Research International 34, no.3(2009): 256-266. 
46
 Jacques Derrida, “The Theater of Cruelty and the Closure of Representation,” Theater 9 no.3 (1978): 6-19. 
47
 Cornelia Vismann, “’Rejouer les crimes’ - Theater vs. Video,” Cardozo Studies in Law and Literature 11, no.2 
(1999): 161-177; Julie Stone Peters, "Theatricality, Legalism, and the Scenography of Suffering,” Law and 
Literature 18, no. 1 (2006): 15-45. 
48
 Of an immense literature, for example, Pierre Legendre, Law and the Unconscious: A Legendre Reader, trans. 
and ed. Peter Goodrich (London: Palgrave, 1997); Goodrich, “Specters of Law”; Peter Goodrich, “Screening 
Law,” Law and Literature 21, no. 1 (2009):  1-23; Peter Goodrich, “ Rhetoric and Somatics: Training the Body to 
do the Work of Law,” Law Text Culture 5, (2000), 241–270; Peter Goodrich, “The Theater of Emblems: On the 
Optical Apparatus and the Investiture of Persons,” Law, Culture & the Humanities 8, no.1, (2012): 47-67. 
49
 For example, Christian Biet, “Law, Literature, Theater: The Fiction of Common Judgment,” Law and 
Humanities 5, no.2 (2011), 281-292. 
50
 Maria Aristodemou, Law and Literature: Journeys From Her to Eternity, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2000), in particular ‘Theater as Woman Re-Playing the Word: Towards the Triumph of the Flesh in Aeschylus' 
Oresteia’. 
51
 Connal Parsley, “The Mask and Agamben: the Transitional Juridical Technics of Legal Relation,” Law Text 
Culture 14, (2010): 12-39; Richard Mohr, “Flesh and the Person,” Australian Feminist Law Journal 29, (2008), 
31-52. 
52
 Peter Rush, “Killing Me Softly with His Words: Hunting the Law Student,” Law and Critique 1, no.1 (1990):  
21-37. 
53
 Marett Leiboff, “Theatricalising Law in Three, 1929-1939 (Brisbane),” Law Text Culture 20, (2016): 93-
135; Leiboff, “Towards a jurisprudence of the embodied mind”; Leiboff, “Law, Muteness and the Theatrical.” 
54
 Julen Extabe, The Experience of Tragic Judgment, (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2013). 
within Shakespeare as drama and theater,55 and the critical readings of law through the play as text, 
such as Honni van Rijskijk’s readings of Sarah Kane’s Blasted,56 or the transcript of trials and 
judgments reinscribed as play - testimonial or tribunal theater  – amply reveals the play and place of 
play and drama as a critical account of law and concerns of justice. Along with political theater, 
Augusto Boal’s spect-actor and his legislative theater, this theater all tells us something about law, as 
too its filmic double; the move into theatrocracy important as a political challenge, but it is the 
theatrical anagnorisis that largely been overlooked in thinking about law,57 and that to my mind 
provides that thing to challenge To think law theatrically, then, is to think it as a means through 
which we are challenged in our beliefs, certainties, assumptions and prejudices, to be challenged to 
think what we are and who were are.  
 
Reading  
During a talk to a group at a university I once tried to illustrate how an audience affects actors by the 
quality of its attention. I asked for a volunteer.  A man came forward, and I gave him a sheet of paper 
on which was typed a speech from Peter Weiss’s play about Auschwitz, The Investigation … The 
volunteer was too struck and too appalled by what he was reading [and] … something of his 
seriousness and concentration reached the audience and it fell silent. Then at my request he began to 
read out loud … Immediately the audience understood. 
Peter Brook The Empty Space 1968
58
 
‘The Theater Lab seeks a spectator-witness, but the spectator's testimony is only possible if the actor achieves 
an authentic act. If there is no authentic act, what is there to testify to?’ 59 
 
Jerzy Grotowski 1969 
 
The Frankfurt Auschwitz trials are barely remembered now, but when Peter Brook got his student to 
read the text of Peter Weiss’ play (that would now be called testimonial theater), the events in 
Germany were fresh in people’s minds. In the early-mid 1960s, along with the Eichmann trial, the 
conduct of life and death in Nazi Germany and beyond was raw and live. Peter Brook had no trouble 
getting his volunteer student to read the text, with no acting or hamming, and the audience deeply 
responding. In this epigraph, we also notice that something happened in silence, too, that is before 
any words were read. The student, whose silent read had already said enough, changed the 
atmosphere, that caused an attentiveness and a response – in the sense of forming a responsibility – 
in those present. In Jerzy Grotowski’s terms, the young reader’s authenticity created a form of 
testimony in those who spectate, whose responsibility is shaped through that encounter. Let me 
now break the spell, for Brook did the same thing with another student, giving him the names of the 
French and English from Henry V. It was terrible. The second student hammed, putting on posh and 
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declaiming, not reading. The audience, needless to say, did not respond. In attempting to unpick the 
problem, the answer of the students was simple. Auschwitz was in a near past, Agincourt aeons 
before. Brook then got the student actor to read and audience respond with the Shakespearean 
text, as names as lived individuals, ‘as if the butchery had occurred in living memory’.60 Brook 
describes a situation where the reader now read the names as if they were live, and the audience 
concentrated hard. Now the names hung with a heavy silence after each name was read out, the 
reader responding to the lives that had been lost, and the audience responded - as spectator-
witnesses. It was now an authentic, and marked a profound anagnorisis, not in any didactic or lyrical 
sense, but through the bodies of those who read and responded. But these bodies were not empty 
vessels, the theasthai of their silent responses shaped through another body, whose silence (or laughter or 
enragement), demands a response. The precise neurobiological basis for this response is now understood, but 
in the 1960s was yet to be uncovered. For I stress, this is a response of the body, first and foremost, despite 
the involvement of words. In the first instance, there was silence which drew in the audience, just as the words 
repelled in a vacuum but were redeemed with a sense of being. 
Of course, the 1960s are now 50 years ago, and the events of Nazi Germany that were still so horrifically fresh 
at the time now bear a stronger resemblance to Agincourt in terms of time, place and distance, at an 
intellectual level. New horrors have taken over. Brook would tell actors to reach into what they know to make 
Weiss’ play speak now, or Shakespeare’s. Without that point of connection, which dramaturg Hana Worthen 
calls a nodal knot, there can be no ability for connections between actors and audience to be made.
61
 In other 
work, I have shown how easily the texts of law become something different once a generation or two loses 
sight of the events of a past that are imbricated within law, reordering texts accordingly. Without that point of 
connection, there is a tin ear. But of course, this is serious when texts are altered to suit, when the point of an 
anagnorisis is misplaced and reordered to suit politics or purpose. What this suggests is that the 
point of the theatrical is that the way we read is a two-way street, one that demands an active and 
conscious response or responsiveness.62 
But for lawyers, the idea of the theatrical can be so easily misunderstood. In 2006, Sir Alan Moses, 
then a judge, presented a lecture called The Mask and the Judge at Trinity College Oxford that was 
later reproduced an article in the Southern Cross Law Review in Australia. The purpose of the mask 
was to shield the court, the judge, from their own personal response to injustice, for the law to be 
applied.63 In 2014, he left the Court of Appeal, moving to a press complaints role.  In The Guardian’s 
view ‘He is the court of appeal judge who showed too much personality to advance to the very 
summit of the judiciary.’64 As Connal Parsley reminds us (along with the critical position of the mask 
and persona in law), the mask and persona, in the Ciceronian sense, was to ensure a conformity and 
expectation of being,65 and more recent work on the personhood in law turns us away from the 
theatrical of the kind that is productive in law – that is for lawyers to move beyond the theatrical as 
a negative and the body of the interpreter as a negative, and move towards the body as positive. 
We can look to the work that Ann Genovese, Shaun McVeigh and Peter Rush have carried out on 
office, responsibility, and the forms of training that a jurisprudent should carry out for a more 
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responsive exercise of writing through jurisography. Their recommendation is to undertake training 
in responsibility through Pierre Hadot’s training in philosophy through the practice of writing:  
Since the nineteen eighties, law and humanities scholarship and its various 
institutions have developed a number of distinct modes of investigating forms of law 
and the ways in which we might conduct lawful relations or belong to law. One way 
centres on the question of how might a life be lived and lived well. This question, 
which has links to the Greeks, and since, sits at the centre of particular traditions of 
philosophy, history, and jurisprudence. We call this the conduct of life tradition, and 
following the historian Pierre Hadot, we are interested in how these disciplines - 
especially philosophy - treat their daily tasks as ‘spiritual exercises’ or forms of 
training in how to live and meet the obligations of their disciplinary, or later 
institutional, office. At least in part, jurisprudence, we argue, can be treated as a 
training in persona and office. For us, jurisography is a way to train ourselves, as a 
form of discipline or exercise, to explain how we think and act with the writing of 
jurisprudence. It is not so much conceptually programmatic as a studied 
acknowledgement of the relational duties of the writer and the jurisprudent, and of 
the experiences of a life lived with law. The duties that attach to the persona of 
jurisographer, we suggest, are to take care of the many forms and sources of the 
material expression and styles of jurisprudence that the jurisographer inherits, and, 
to be clear, that they are not only inherited from jurists, judges and jurisprudents. It 
is also to understand how the fragmentary sources and forms of jurisprudence that 
people live with everyday (the official, and the unofficial) condition and contour the 
conduct of their lawful relations in our own time (references omitted).66 
But one thing is missing here, in the forms of writing and the conduct of office that they recommend. 
And that is that there is an assumption – that responsibility will come through writing. I suggest, 
instead, that it has to come through the body and to acknowledge that a trained body will not laugh 
when they ought not, will not be outraged when they ought not, and that the body will respond 
carefully – so long as the body (of lawyer, judge, reader) is made responsive and responsible beyond 
the self. Olivia Barr’s movement,67 and Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos,68 in the places and 
spaces of movement, asking us to notice how we walk and what that walk entails, 69 and what 
materialities afford, and through that the responsibilities that the jurist holds and enacts. Thus law is 
a call to response and responsibility, to a form of training in life and lifeworld to be an active 
lawyer.70 
 
Training the body to take responsibility 
In Poland there is a small company led by a visionary, Jerzy Grotowski, that also has a sacred aim. The 
theater, he believes, cannot be an end in itself ... [it] is a vehicle, a means for self-study, self-
exploration, a possibility of salvation. The actor has himself as his field of work … [and] does not 
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hesitate to show himself exactly as he is, for he realizes that the secret of the role demands his 
opening up … so that the act of performance is an act of sacrifice … his gift to the spectator.
71
 
Peter Brook The Empty Space 1968 
The core of theater is encounter. The man who makes an act of self-revelation is one who 
establishes contact with himself. 
Grotowski Towards a Poor Theater 196872 
 
I will end now, with a series of epigraphs, and a small story of a presentation. I am in the process of 
finalising the writing of a long-overdue book, Towards a Theatrical Jurisprudence, and I am indebted 
to Grotowski, the title of my book referencing the one theater theorist who I took far too long to 
understand, and his seminal book of writings. I leave you with a small sense of the Grotowskian 
encounter, and the demands it makes on the spectator. 
It is December 2015 and I present a piece at the Law Literature Humanities conference at UTS in 
Sydney. My piece has been placed in a Law and Literature panel. Theater is a hard nut to crack. I play 
a series of images, prefaced by a few references from Lehmann and one or other of these remarks of 
Grotowski. I play images that might be read, or misread, that have no text, and very little to do with 
what I am saying. I refer to a brand-new defamation decision, and the way that counsel in the case 
was able to remind the court of the Holocaust, in the face of a defamation claim by a self-declared 
Holocaust denier. The court had no trouble understanding this argument of counsel for the defence, 
which spoke to a time before. The images flowed, some making immediate sense, the Nazi entering 
Paris, and others that seemed to make no sense at all. I asked a French colleague to come, as I knew 
she would know the images that made no sense. These were of the Vel d’Hiv, an infamous moment 
in French history, that were recently denied as a French obligation by Marine Le Pen, in 2017. I write 
these final words on these pages just as she was defeated as the candidate for President of the 
Republic. The images didn’t lie, and most of France did not forget The Great Stain. Law thinks that it 
is fine to know rules, without knowing, or understanding how to know. We can look to theater to be 
reminded that, an unknowing self has the potential in law to do harm. 
 
The Present 
The cinema flashed on to a screen images from the past. As this is what the mind does to itself all 
through life, the cinema seems intimately real. Of course, it is nothing of the sort … The theater, on 
the other hand, always asserts itself in the present. This is what can make it more real than the 
normal stream of consciousness. This is also what can make it so disturbing.
73  
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These weren’t the only images I showed. There was a moment of confusion, where I placed images 
of Mai ’68 as a link between those of Nazi Germany and what was to come, and because1968 was 
the year that Peter Brook, Jerzy Grotowski, and Richard Schechner published or contributed to 
publications inaugurating profound changes in the understanding of theater in the west.  But there 
was another reason, because these images could be and were hard to read, seemingly speaking to 
World War Two images of Paris that had just ended. These images meant nothing, for a reason. 
Some people in the room knew, but I wanted the confusion to be palpable, to obtain that 
momentary realisation of being out of one’s depth, where a confusion of images appeared that did 
not make sense.  I felt fright and anticipation in the room. But then comfort – of the worst kind - 
new and familiar horrors were restored as the images moved again, into the present. They became 
familiar. Charlie Hebdo, the Bataclan, raw and alive, then and there. The images started to make 
sense, and those earlier unfamiliar images had the potential to mean something, that might have 
something to do with the horrors unfolding in Europe during 2015. The other images, of Mai ‘68, 
could now be read, to an extent. The audience was silent. It was present. It was alive. 
 
It was disturbing 
And then I explained the most disturbing images of all. They weren’t from the present, or Mai ’68, 
but of those events that animated those men and women who developed theater in the 1960s. Here 
it was.  A few images of men in the street and men at a train station. And of the Vel d’Hiv, images 
that looked so ordinary and everyday. But they were not silent, for Jewish men were being arrested 
in the street and deported, and the buses outside the Vel d’Hiv were waiting to deport those 
entrapped there – to be deported out of France. The words I spoke of the Vel d’Hiv mattered. They 
probably won’t be recalled by those there, and I won’t repeat it here, on these page, but they made 
the anagnorisis I sought manifest, in that experience and encounter that makes us notice injustice, 
and how to keep reminding ourselves how law, without experience, creates the conditions of 
injustice.  
 
At these rare moments, the theater of joy, of catharsis, of celebration, the theater of exploration, the theater 
of shared meaning are one. But once gone, the moment is gone and it cannot be recaptured slavishly by 
imitation – the deadly creeps back, the search beings again.
74 
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Here then, on the brink of an unwritten history, on the edge of the positive unconscious of law, similar in kind 
to the encryption, is a synecdoche, a mark of a hidden history of the juridical. We have literally to look behind 
the scenes, into the emptiness that is filled by images and imaginings, to apprehend the staging of law as a 
theatrical and present drama. 
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